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Forum: Equal Protection and
the Burger Court
At the invitationof the Quarterly,Professors Jesse Choper of Boalt
Hall, Ray Forresterof Cornell, Gerald Gunther of Stanford and Philip
Kurlandof Chicago participatedon March 22, 1975, in a panel discussion of recent events in equal protection cases. ProfessorSullivan of Hastings College served as the moderator. A video-tape recording of the
conversation is on reserve at the Prosser Videotape Library at Hastings.
Following initial remarks, members of the audience submitted
written questions or asked questions orally of the panel. The following is
a partially edited transcriptof the two hour forum.*
PROFESSOR FORRESTER: Thank you, Professor Sullivan.
It's a pleasure to be here and to see so many good friends.
I would like to say initially that the subject we are discussing involves a great mass of material. A surprising number of recent cases have
centered in one way or the other on this general matter. In attempting to
review and simplify that material in these introductory remarks, I am
cautioned by H. L. Mencken's observation that there is a simple answer
to every complex problem, and it is wrong.
Although there is only one brief equal protection clause in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has managed to build it into a monolithic
body of law, which is somewhat remindful of Mark Twain's description
of the massive prehistoric animal which he saw in an exhibit at the
Smithsonian. Back home someone asked, "What did you think about it,
Sam?" and he replied, "One bone and a ton of plaster." But the ton of
judicial plaster that has been fashioned around the equal protection
clause has been reduced in recent years to two general doctrines-the
traditional standard of equal protection and the so-called new standard
of equal protection. For many years, as I see it, the new equal protection
* In 1972 Professor Gunther wrote a Foreword for the Harvard Law Review
discussing the 1971 Supreme Court Term, in which he argued that the Court was
evolving a new equal protection standard. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 TermForeword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972). Because the equal protection
panel used this very important article as a touchstone from which to examine treatment
by the Burger Court of equal protection issues, there are repeated references to it
throughout the discussion. For the sake of convenience, however, most citations to the
article have been omitted.
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standard was not formalized. Comments are to be found using the words
of the standard in early cases, such as the McLaughlin1 case and the
Skinner' case, but there was no definitive and doctrinal statement of it.
However in 1969 in Shapiro v. Thompson,3 Justice Brennan's majority
opinion stated the doctrine as if it were a general proposition of law and
not something used in arguendo in deciding whether a particular situation offended the equal protection clause.
In 1973 Mr. Justice Powell, in San Antonio Independent School
Districtv. Rodriguez,4 took the trouble, for the benefit of first-year law
students and their law professors, to spell out the details of the new
equal protection standard. When spelled out the rules became rather
numerous. He said that the new test provides that when governmental
action creates a class based on suspect criteria, or which abridges. a fundamental right, it is subject to strict scrutiny by the judiciary, and the
government has the heavy burden of showing to the satisfaction of the
judges that there is a compelling governmental interest in making the
classification. Further, the law must be structured with precision and
tailored narrowly to serve legitimate objectives. It must choose the
least drastic means, the least restrictive alternative to accomplish its
ends, and the usual presumption of constitutionality is removed. In addition, Powell spelled out the traditional indicia of the suspectness of a
class. The indicia are-whether the class is saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful or unequal treatment,
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
He suggested that the answer to whether a particular subject involves a fundamental right lies in assessing whether there is such a right
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Examples of the
so-called suspect class are race, nationality and alienage. An example of
a classification relating to a fundamental right is the right to travel,
which was the basis for the Shapiro5 decision. These are, as I see it, the
fundamental rules of the new equal protection doctrine.
I have had more difficulty in identifying precisely the traditional
standard of equal protection. I find in my reading that there are a number of standards which come under this title. For example, Powell, in
this same Rodriguez6 case has stated that the test is whether the state law
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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bears some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes, but in the
very same opinion he expressed it somewhat differently. He said the test
is whether the law rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose. Chief
Justice Warren, in the well-known McGowan' case, frequently cited as
the basic decision defining the traditional doctrine, made the statement:
"Although no precise formula has been developed, a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Other judges in other cases have used different formulations. For example, Justice Harlan at one time said the test is
whether the law is "rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective." Stewart, in the recent Geduldig8 case, said that the test is
whether the line drawn by the state amounts to invidious discrimination.
And in the 1974 case of Kahn v. Shevin,9 regarding sex discrimination,
Justice Douglas used as the traditional test language to the effect that
the law must be reasonably designed to further a valid state policy.
But Mr. Justice Black, some years ago in the Harper0 case, pretty well
spilled the beans by saying that the test really involves a number of
catchwords such as "irrational," "unreasonable," "arbitrary," "invidious."
Now, in my view, these various verbalizations of the doctrine are
not the same. As I see it, "any relation" is not the same as "some relation," or the same as "a relation," or as "a reasonablerelation."
In addition to these varying formulations of the traditional test, the
Court has recently been borrowing from the substantive due process
doctrine in spelling out the meaning of the phrase. For example, in Reed
v. Reed," Chief Justice Berger for the Court struck down a sex classification saying that the classification must rest on some ground of distinction having a "fair and substantialrelation" to the object of the legislation, so that all persons in similar situations shall be treated alike.
This language, "fair and substantial relation," is very similar to that used
in one of the early and leading cases on substantive due process. In Mugler v. Kansas,'2 which was decided in 1887, the opinion said the courts
"are under a solemn duty to look at the substance of things .. .. If,
therefore, a statute purporting . . . to protect the public health . . .
has no real or substantial relation to those objects . . . it is the duty of
the courts to so adjudge. . ....
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
416 U.S. 351 (1974).
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
404U.S.71 (1971).
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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Thus, it seems we find the Court beginning to borrow from the
concepts of substantive due process in spelling out the meaning of the
equal protection clause.
Along with these two basic approaches, an additional development has taken place. It is illustrated by Frontiero v. Richardson,1 3 a
1973 sex discrimination case in which the Supreme Court held a federal
statute unconstitutional. The Court couldn't use the equal protection
clause to strike down the law because, as you know, that's in the Fourteenth Amendment and is applicable only to the states. It has no application to the federal government. So, the Court used the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment but borrowed and applied the specific
rules of the new equal protection standard, such as the compelling state
interest language, strict scrutiny, suspectness, fundamental rights, etc.
This case, along with Richardson v. Belcher 4 and Roe v. Wade, 5 the
abortion case, exemplifies the interchange of standards now practiced
by the Court in the use of the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution. Now think of that combination. If there are two
semantic blanks in the American Constitution which can mean anything
you want them to mean if you have a vote on the Supreme Court, they
are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. Holmes
said, "Due process is reasonableness judicially determined." It appears
now that equal protection is also reasonableness judicially determined.
This, it seems to me, is significant in connection with the present status of
the law and what is now going on within the Supreme Court. This is
a guess, and I may be totally wrong, but it looks to me as if some of
the members of the Court, when confronted with this combination of
due process and equal protection under these highly restrictive interventionist standards, began to shy away from the use of the new doctrine in a categorical, comprehensive fashion in relation to additional
subjects such as sex discrimination, poverty, and so on. And it seems
that between 1969, when Shapiro 6 first formally and explicitly asserted
the doctrine, and the present time, something took place inside the
Court. Some of the justices became concerned with the expansion of
a doctrine that promised to establish a new and greater level of judicial power than had existed before. And subsequently, today we find
that the momentum which appeared to be building with Shapiro toward
a higher standard of judicial review through the extension of the new
equal protection rules seems to have subsided.
13.
14.
15.
16.

411 U.S.
404 U.S.
410 U.S.
394 U.S.

677 (1973).
78 (1971).
113 (1973).
618 (1969).
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The Court appears now to be marking time, deciding cases under
other concepts which can gain the support of a majority of the Court.
For example, in 1973 in Vlandis v. Kline," it used the rule against
arbitrary irrebuttable presumptions to knock out a classification which
could have been tested under the new equal protection doctrine if the
Court had chosen to use it. And the Court has also relied on the traditional equal protection standard more frequently. For example,
Mr. Justice Douglas, in the recent 1974 case of Kahn v. Shevin,18
used traditional equal protection as the test to measure the constitutionality of a Florida law which gave a property tax exemption to widows
but not to widowers. In the course of his opinion, he took occasion to
observe, "The dissent would use the equal protection laws as a vehicle
for reinstating notions of substantive due process that have been repudiated. 'We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that
courts do not substitute their social and economical beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies who are elected to pass laws."' And he quoted
the opinion of his colleague, Hugo Black, in the earlier case of Ferguson
v. Skrupa,19 in which Black soundly condemned the doctrine of substantive due process and urged that it be abandoned.
I think that it is significant that Mr. Justice Douglas, who is sensitive to discrimination, would shy away, as I am suggesting, from the new
equal protection doctrine in testing a law involving sex discrimination.
His objection to the reinstatement of substantive due process through the
equal protection law makes me think that he and other members of the
Court have decided that the Court must not go too far in the use of the
new equal protection tests. There is at least one member of the Court,
however, who holds resolutely to the idea. Mr. Justice Brennan, who is
primarily responsible for the effort to establish the new concept, continues to press the point, still uses it in his opinions, sometimes now
in his dissenting opinions, and serves to remind the Court that the doctrine is still there. It has not been repudiated, though it seems to be
used now in a more selective way than Brennan would prefer. The
majority has not challenged the suspectness of race, they have not repudiated the fundamental nature of the right to travel. These still stand,
but the majority refuses to move boldly into a new level of judicial review under the banner of new equal protection. Now the old doctrine,
of course, is very lenient. It is permissive. In some of its forms such
17. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
18. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
19. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
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as the "any relation" test it is highly permissive. On its face it does
not give the Court much power. It is a model expression of judicial
self-restraint. On the other hand, the tests of new equal protection are
highly interventionist, very strict. In fact, as Professor Gunther has
pointed out in his Foreword, when the Court applies that test to a law,
the result is nearly always fatal to the law. So, you have a hard choice
there between the too permissive rule of the old test and the too restrictive and interventionist nature of the new test. We should pause here
to give Professor Gunther credit for being the first, or one of the first
scholars, who early on saw the implications here.
It has been suggested that the Court is formulating a third rule, the
newer equal protection standard, by invoking the real and substantial
relations test, which is a middle position between the old and the new and
is designed to take care of those cases where the Court wants to strike
down the law but does not find either of the two categories quite appropriate.
My own impression is that the Court is reaching "middle" results
but without, so far, actually adopting a newer equal protection standard
of moderate impact. So, it looks to me as if the Court is reaching the
results it wants-middle results, more interventionist than the old test,
but less restrictive than the new. It usually does this within the rubric of
traditional equal protection language, borrowing at times from the langauge of substantive due process as in Reed v. Reed."0
Well, like most law professors, I can go on forever on my favorite
subject, but I am going to bring myself to stop-now!
PROFFESSOR SULLIVAN: Professor Choper, would you like to
speak at this time-either an initial statement or a comment on what
Professor Forrester had to say?
PROFESSOR CHOPER: I would like to say at the outset that I am
also very pleased to have been able to come across the bay this morning.
I had intended to say, "to visit at a sister law schoor'; but given the
subject of the discussion today, I think I better not say that for fear
that since it is clear that the Hastings College of Law is subject to the
state action prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment, even under the
narrowest reading, I would likely get in trouble.
I think it's fairly easy to state where the Court is and what it is
doing so far as equal protection is concerned. If it finds a statutory
classification that it feels is so bad that it ought to hold it unconstitu20. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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tional, it does so. With increasing frequency it uses the traditional
equal protection test in the process, finding statutory classifications
either "arbitrary" or "irrational." On other occasions, it uses the "compelling state interesf test to invalidate a statutory classification. And,
in several instances, when some doctrine or one case or another stands
in the way, it uses the "irrebuttable presumption' approach to strike
down a statutory classification.
On the other hand, when it believes that a particular classification
is not so bad as to be held unconstitutional, it upholds it, usually invoking the rationality doctrine. It is very much like Thomas Reed Powell's
classic description of the validity of state regulations of interstate commerce-but the results don't turn as much on who the members of the
Court happen to be at a particular time but rather on what the feelings
of a majority of the justices happen to be in respect to a particular classification.
Equal protection doctrine is many faceted. One can attempt to
divide it in a number of ways. There is the category of classifications
that impinge on "fundamental rights" and its companion category of
classifications in respect to "suspect" groups. There is the "rationality"
test on the one hand and the "compelling state interest" test on the
other. Further, there is the distinction between de jure and de facto
discriminations-an area that has been largely overlooked by the
Court. We have heard very little from the Court in respect to this, although it hovers in the background very significantly as the Court expands the scope of the equal protection clause, especially in regard to
suspect classifications. An important decision in this area that has generated surprisingly little attention is Jefferson v. Hackney.2 1 The Court
was confronted with a de facto discrimination on the basis of race in
the sense that the statute before it operated in a statistical fashion to
discriminate against minority races. The case involved a fairly complicated Texas system of funding welfare programs. It was demonstrated
to the Court, to put it generally, that the state more generously funded
those public assistance programs that benefitted groups with relatively
small minority populations than it did those welfare programs whose
recipients were more heavily black and chicano. The argument was
that since the system operated to discriminate against minority groups,
it ought to be judged by the strict equal protection standard of review.
Yet, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with no real dissent from
the basic proposition, the Court held that so long as there was a rational
21. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
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basis for the state's classification, it would survive equal protection
attack.
Another highly important aspect of equal protection doctrine on
which the Court seems to have carefully avoided making any significant
statement concerns "benign" or "reverse" discrimination. So far as
race is concerned, the Court totally sidestepped the problem in the De
Funis22 case. In two sex discrimination cases, the Court upheld such
a classification: Kahn v. Shevin,23 involving a discrimination against
widowers in the grant of property tax exemptions; Schlesinger v. Ballard,24 involving a discrimination against male naval officers in the matter of mandatory discharges. In both of these cases the Court used the
rationality test, and it is very difficult to distinguish these cases from
those in which it has used this very same test to invalidate discriminations against women.
This leads to the last matter I would like to comment on for just
a few minutes-the tremendous ambiguity that exists with respect to
suspect classifications, that aspect of equal protection, so far as the Burger Court is concerned, that appears to be the most fruitful area for
expansion.
The Court under Chief Justice Burger has certainly not retreated
to any meaningful degree from the notion that discriminations against
racial minorities are suspect. It has also made clear what was unclear
before the Burger Court-that discriminations against aliens are also
to be treated as suspect. This means that almost all discriminations
against aliens are going to be held invalid. I say "almost all" because
the Court has left open the issue of those particular kinds of state discriminations against aliens that deal with matters peculiar to citizenship such as voting and holding high public office. Beyond this, the
Court has also left open the very interesting question of federal discriminations against aliens, that is, whether the national governmenfs
very broad power over immigration and naturalization granted in Article I will result in the Court applying a different equal protection
standard for discriminations imposed by the federal government as opposed to those imposed by the states. That would probably be about
the only area of equal protection adjudication in which the Court is going to treat federal discriminations differently from those by the states.
But when one looks beyond race and alienage at the opinions of
22. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
23. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
24. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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the Burger Court, there is substantial ambiguity and confusion. The
sex discrimination cases are illustrative. In the past several years, the
Court has struck down two statutory discriminations against women2 6 Both decisions used the
Reed v. Reed25 and Frontierov. Richardson.
rationality test despite the fact, I think, that by any reasonable standard
the statutory classifications were perfectly rational in accomplishing a
permissible government purpose. On the other hand, when the Court
was confronted, in Geduldig v. Aiello,27 with a statutory classification
that looked as though it were a discrimination against women-a California statute that denied disability insurance benefits for pregnancythe Court held it to be not violative of equal protection because it was
not sex discrimination.
Geduldig raises some fascinating issues as to how discrimination
is to be defined. Nonetheless, it is pretty difficult, I believe, to justify
the Court's conclusion that when a particular trait that is common exclusively to only one of the sexes is involved, that that is not sex discrimination. At the same time, when confronted with statutory discriminations in favor of women, the Court has had little difficulty using
the rationality standard to uphold those classifications.
So, I think that we still don't know precisely where the Court is
so far as sex discrimination is concerned. The record is far from clear
that the Court is willing to strike down every form of sex discrimination, even those against women, as is evidenced by the Geduldig case.
Nor is it wholly clear that the Court will uphold every discrimination
in favor of women. But there is no doubt that a majority of the Court
has been unwilling to go one inch beyond the rationality test, despite
the fact that its use in this area involves a good deal of waffling and

fudging.
The other two major classifications that advocates have put forward as being suspect are illegitimacy and poverty. Again, it is very
difficult to make any doctrinal sense out of what the Court has done.
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.2" it came very close to holding that illegitimacy was a suspect classification. ButMr. Justice Powell
writing for the Court managed at the very end of the opinion, in strik-

ing down a state discrimination against illegitimate children, to say that
25.
26.
27.
28.

404 U.S.
411 U.S.
417 U.S.
406 U.S.

71 (1971).
677 (1973).
484 (1974).
164 (1972).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[VoL 2

the state interest was neither compelling nor rational and thus couldn't
be upheld under any circumstances.
Last term, in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 9 the Court speaking
through Chief Justice Burger was careful to point out that it had not
decided whether illegitimacy was a suspect classification. The Jimenez
case has drawn little attention. But the doctrinal approach, particularly
coming from Chief Justice Burger, is absolutely fascinating. The chief
justice, who has consistently berated his colleagues for using the irrebuttable presumption notion in a series of cases under the patina of
the due process clause, then uses it himself in the Jimenez case, but
this time in the process of finding a violation of equal protection.
Finally, the poverty classification seems to me to be one that also
manifests the ambiguity of the Burger Court in the matter of equal protection. I guess that it was widely believed that if the suspect classification category were going to be expanded, a de jure discrimination
against poor people, that is, the state singling out poor people for adverse treatment, would easily qualify. I think that if one went through
the statute books of the fifty states and of the United States Code, one
would find very, very few such laws that explicitly discriminate against
poor people. Yet rwhen one came to the Court's attention, the Court
managed to uphold it. James v. Valtierrad0 was a case involving a California constitutional provision which required that, in order to have
low-cost housing built in any particular area, a special hurdle had to
be overcome-it had to be approved by referendum. The Court found
no violation of equal protection, saying that there was no explicit discrimination against poor people but in a way which, I think, just will
not withstand analysis.
On the other hand, the Court has in a number of decisions struck
down de facto discriminations against poor people. It seemed in the
first years of the Burger Court that that was going to be an area of
potential expansion. There were three cases-Williams v. Illinois,31
Tate v. Short 2 and Boddie v. Connecticut33-in which the Court invalidated de facto discriminations against poor people. Williams and
Tate rested on equal protection; the Boddie decision went on due proc29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

417 U.S. 628
402 U.S. 137
399 U.S. 235
401 U.S. 395
401 U.S. 371

(1974).
(1971).
(1970).
(1971).
(1971).
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ess grounds because Mr. Justice Harlan wrote for the Court. Williams
and Tate involved the question of indigents having to go to jail after
a criminal conviction because they were unable to pay the fine. The
Court, following the decisions of its predecessor in Griffin v. Illinois"4
3 5 held that it was violative of equal protecand Douglas v. California,
tion to discriminate against poor people in this way. Although using
the due process clause in Boddie, but effectively following the earlier
view of the equal protection cases, the Court struck down a requirement that persons pay filing fees in order to obtain a divorce. Note
that none of these were statutory classifications that explicitly singled
out poor people for adverse treatment. They simply operated adversely
so far as poor people were concerned. Yet the trend was halted in the
case of United States v. Kras,s6 when the Court held that equal protection did not require the government to waive the fee for an indigent
in order to become bankrupt. And the same result was reached in
Ortwein v. Schwab3 7 in respect to a fee in order to get judicial review
of adverse welfare decisions, the Court holding that this de facto discrimination against poor people was not violative of equal protection.
Overall, poor people have fared better than racial minorities so
far as de facto discriminations are concerned. But in the one case involving an explicit discrimination against the poor, James v. Valtierra,3
the Court was unwilling to find an equal protection violation. Thus,
this series of decisions dealing with suspect classifications illustrates the
proposition, I think, that one cannot discern or predict any really meaningful doctrine, so far as the Court's equal protection decisions go.
I will stop there.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: Thank you. Mr. Gunther, it's your turn.
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: Well, I think enough has already been
said to indicate that a group of law professors getting together to talk
about equal protection may give constitutional law a bad name. I think
it is clear that no one here has a magic wand to straighten out what
continues to be the most chaotic, least thoughtfully considered, and
least adequately justified area of constitutional law.
I suppose one can say that at the end of the Warren era doctrine
was a good deal clearer, though in large part unjustified. What the
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

351 U.S.
372 U.S.
409 U.S.
410 U.S.
402 U.S.

12 (1956).
353 (1963).
434 (1973).
656 (1973).
137 (1971).
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Warren Court did, as Professor Forrester has said, was increasingly to
expand strict scrutiny of suspect classifications without explaining how it
got there. Moreover, the Court developed or suggested a whole range
of fundamental interests which triggered strict scrutiny. Very often,
there was indeed clarity, but also lack of proffered justification.
The appeal of the equal protection clause to the Warren Court
was evident. I think it was a two-fold appeal. Partly, the appeal lay
in the fact that equal protection did not carry with it the bad reputation
that substantive due process had. Of course, no good, modem, liberal
justice would openly engage in substantive due process adjudication.
Equal protection was a fairly inert and harmless looking doctrine, a
doctrine which did not carry a great deal of baggage-baggage of disreputable history. The second appeal was obviously the appeal of
egalitarianism and equality. As Mr. Kurland long ago pointed out, it
was a great banner to carry, although a most difficult one to apply, for
equalizing across the board was neither historically nor constitutionally
justifiable. Nor was it anything any rational Court would try to do in
terms of eliminating all classifcations, or all differential impacts of
legislation, or all differentials in society. So, by the end of the Warren
Court we knew roughly where we were, though not why, and not where
else we might be going. Most of us were uncertain about what new
interests might be included within the purview of the new equal protection, by analogy to other interests which were regarded as fundamental.
And it was hard to explain how the Court got to new suspect classifications and fundamental interests once it went beyond the obvious area
of race discrimination. But all observers knew very well that if they
could not persuade the Court to discover a trigger for strict scrutiny,
their cause was hopeless. The deferential attitude was about as harmless to challenged legislation as the strict scrutiny attitude was a guarantee that the law would be held invalid.
Well, what has happened with the Burger Court? The Burger
Court is less predictable. The Burger Court is a lot less clear in its
doctrine. The Burger Court has not done much better than the Warren Court in justifying what interventions it has undertaken. My attempted argument of a couple of years ago was not that the Burger
Court had made sense but that some of its steps might be explained
in a way which would make some sense if the Court were willing to
articulate the reasons and apply the standards consistently. The one
thing that one can say about the Burger Court's performance in equal
protection is that equal protection has remained an interventionist tool.
That, I suppose, is a reflection of the phenomenon that people putting
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on those black robes and sitting in Washington-no matter how antiinterventionist they may be in theory and how strict constructionist they
may be in profession-cannot resist the temptation to contribute their
two cents to a lot of issues that grab their attention. I don't think that
is a bad thing. I think the Constitution justifiably warrants some intervention. The real question is: What are adequate justifications for the
intervention?
The phenomenon that I commented on in my article, as Mr. Forrester mentioned earlier, is that the minimal rationality standardwhich had been a very deferential standard in the Warren years, and
which was equivalent to saying that if a case fell into that deferential
area of the old equal protection, the law would be sustained-that
standard has in the 1970's become a basis for intervention. Recognizing the difficulties of model building and simplifying, I nevertheless
tried to argue that the Warren Court had been too deferential in applying the old equal protection, rationality standard. I did not try to set
up in my simple model a third layer of intermediate scrutiny. Rather,
I suggested some closing of the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential scrutiny (or non-scrutiny). I argued that the Court could justifiably examine, with some genuine scrutiny, legislation even if it did not
involve a suspect classification or impinge on a fundamental interest
or right. (The latter, of course, hardly needed the equal protection
clause to justify strict scrutiny.) In that area of rationality review, I
urged that the Court could do more by bending over backwards less,
by not hypothesizing conceivable purposes. I argued, for example, that
classifications should be tested in terms of articulated or actual stated
purposes, instead of testing the necessary "fit" in terms of purposes the
Court's imaginativeness had supplied. That search for purposes is a
thorny area which we can come back to.
The more difficult, second part of my appeal is that, instead of
simply saying "a reasonable man could conceive of a connection" between means and ends, the Court would exercise a real, though modest,
scrutiny of the relationship between means and ends. In short, the
Court would test in terms of articulated rather than hypothesized purposes, and it would ask whether the means truly did, within some area
of permissible flexibility, promote those ends.
Now you are quite right, Professor Forrester, that the Court has
not written an opinion saying "that's the new test." I should add that
when I wrote the Foreword,3 9 it was the first term the Court had really
39. 86 HRv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
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significantly struck down laws while invoking the old rationality standard; and I did not find a single case among the half dozen examples
of that year that satisfied my model. I said in effect that genuinely all
of the cases that I found which invalidated on the basis of the rationality
test were in fact Mickey Mouse cases. They were cases where the
Court had to some extent fudged: it had applied greater scrutiny than
it asserted, and it had presumably done so on the basis of perceived
but unarticulated values.
In short, the cases on which I built my model were not nearly as
value-free as the Court's opinions suggested. Now one conclusion that
one can draw from that is that rationality review is bound to be a hopeless effort, inevitably a facade for obscuring interventionism. The conclusion which I tried to draw, perhaps in naive optimism, was that
though those cases did not do the job right, the justices could do something sensible by taking seriously what they were saying as to standards
in those cases.
What has happened since then, and one can count heads, is that just
about everybody on the Court has now written an opinion at one time or
another which uses significant ingredients of something similar to my
argument. There are sometimes examples in Powell opinions, and
Brennan ones, and others. Justice Brennan's dissent in Schlesinger v.
Ballard0 last fall is among the examples. There are others refusing to
hypothesize purposes and insisting on finding a substantial connection
between nieans and ends. The Court, however, has not done it consistently, or even with adequate explicit care-except perhaps Wiesenfeld4 ' this week. You can count heads, however, and find considerable
support: Brennan and others especially in dissent; Powell in several concurrences, as well as dicta in majority opinions, as in McGinnis v. Royster.42 The majority has used it in some cases, ineffect, without articulation.
Though the Court has not come to grips with it as a generalized
theory, in particular cases it is very useful to litigants. The most recent
case, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 43 is in a sense very much like that. It was
a sex discrimination case, and it was argued very much along newer
equal protection grounds. Women's rights advocate Professor Ruth
Bader Ginsburg of Columbia had originally submitted a long brief in
40.
41.
42.
43.

419 U.S. 498, 511 (1975) ,(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S.Ct. 1225 (1975)..
410U.S.263 (1973).
95-S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
-
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Reed v. Reed44 arguing that sex should be a suspect classification. Those
fifty-some pages of fine argument got nowhere with the Court. The
Court struck down that law on what purported to be a rationality standard, which I do not think could be explained without some special sensitivity to sex classifications which they were unwilling to avow.
In cases since, the arguments for sex as a suspect classification have
understandably become weaker and have been diminished; and the arguments against particular types of legislation have emphasized lack of
connection between means and articulated ends. Again, some of those
cases cannot be explained in terms of the formulas used. I suppose Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,45 of last Wednesday, may come closest of all the
decisions so far to applying the "newer equal protection" in a straightforward, genuine way, without hidden factors inducing an actual scrutiny more intense than the asserted one. It is interesting that eight people
on the Court, everyone that voted, with Justices Powell and Rehnquist
writing separate concurrences, all went along with the basic approach of
Justice Brennan's majority opinion, an opinion which is simply an examination of the legislative purpose as it appears from the legislative
history and the face of the statute. It is unwilling to hypothesize other
purposes or to accept alleged purposes without basis in the record. And
having discovered the actual or articulated legislative purposes, the
Court asks: Does the gender-based classification in this case make any
contribution to furthering those purposes? The Court refuses to find
other conceivable purposes, limits itself to the actual purposes that came
out of the legislative history, and finds those purposes not significantly
furthered by this classification. And, happily, they then strike down the
classification. And rightly so, I believe, and in accordance with the model I tried to set forth. There are a few cases similar to that. But-unfortunately, I think, for the future of "newer equal protection"-this variety
of interventionism is not yet an across-the-board phenomenon. So far,
the minimal-rationality-with-bite approach is being applied in an ad hoe
manner.

I think that what we have is a group of justices who can't resist
intervening sometimes; by and large, a new group of justices who have
not yet developed an adequate feel for connecting one case in one area
with another. They respond to situations in terms of particularized contexts. "Newer equal protection!' is a convenient test to invoke occasionally during this groping, searching period. It at least makes a little-bit
-

44. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
45. 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
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more sense than the nonsense of the irrebuttable presumptions analysis,
which is essentially equal protection analysis under a completely misleading name. But the "newer equal protection" won't be respectable
and truly defensible unless and until it is taken more seriously as a generally applicable rule.
I suppose that I am less hopeful now than I was two years ago that
the Court will come up with a more coherent explanation of what they
are doing, with consistent applications. I recognize more difficulties
now than I spoke about in the Foreword, as to both purposes and means,
and in application. I would hate to be trying to decide some of the cases
which would be thrown at me to decide. My continued, limited optimism
comes from the fact that the sheer accumulation of cases is such that
there may be some institutional pressure to try and sit back, particularly
as justices get more experienced, to try and make more coherent sense
out of this. I think it is possible to make some sense out of it. It is not
offered to us by the Court today. It is ironic that Chief Justice Burger is
the one who talks most often, going around the country, telling everybody that the courts are getting flooded by too much litigation. I can't
imagine a more flooding device than to be as erratic and ad hoc-ish as
this Court is being in the use of equal protection. Why shouldn't one file a
suit in terms of the lack of ends-means connections, as well as the other
debris that floats around the books, to see if one can win? It is not exactly
a litigation-stifling device. On the other hand, I do not expect the Court
to agree to what Justice Rehnquist's position was at one time: to have
broad deferential attitudes everywhere outside the race area. It is interesting that Justice Rehnquist, for the first time as far as I know, concurs
in Wiesenfeld46 and finds a constitutionally inadequate connection between means and ends in an equal protection case. So, he too has joined
the team outside of the race area to find equal protection an interventionist device, sometimes. How much is "sometimes" and where is "sometimes" is beyond the scope of this discussion, I hope.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: Professor Kurland will now have his opportunity to either support or demolish the statements which have previously been made.
PROFESSOR KURLAND:

I am not going to do either.

It is quite clear to me, and I expect to you, that there is not much
left to be said on the subject. But I haven't come all this distance to sit
here in silence or merely for the purpose of enjoying this climate.
46, id at 1236 (Rehnquist, 1., concurring).
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Mr. Gunther, at the close of his remarks, made a statement reminiscent of Thomas Reed Powell's brief restatement of the commerce clause
of the Constitution, which, as I recall, was that the federal government
may regulate interstate commerce. Part two was that state government
may also regulate interstate commerce, but not too much. How much
is too much, he added, was beyond the scope of this restatement.
My own preference for epitome of the Court's equal protection
cases would be a scene in Hamlet, in which he is walking on stage and
reading a book. Asked what it is that he is reading, he said, "Words, my
lord, words." And I think that is what the problem is with the so-called
doctrines of the equal protection clause. They are only words.
We talk about doctrines as if they were realities, but I think that by
now you have learned that there is very little, if any, substance to the socalled doctrines of the equal protection clause, whether it be the "new
equal protection" or the "old equal protection." For me it is quite clear.
The new equal protection, like the old equal protection, is the old substantive due process. This means, as pointed out to you already, that
the Court will undertake to tell the state and federal legislatures when
they have gone beyond the bounds of what the Supreme Court thinks
it is appropriate for them to do. The difference between the new equal
protection and the old substantive due process is essentially the difference in the hierarchy of values of the Court.
The even older equal protection clause paralleled the old due
process clause. That is, there was a subordination to the legislative will,
which, I think, was what was originally contemplated by those who
framed the Fourteenth Amendment. I must say it is within these terms
that Mr. Gunther's third doctrine could become viable. If it is going to
become viable at all, it is concerned with means and not ends.
In short, there are a lot of rationalizations provided by law professors indirectly, and immediately by law clerks, who submit these
lengthy dissertations to their justices for their signatures and dissemination as the wisdom of the highest court of the land.
I have really only one or two points to make that may not yet have
been made here. One that I think is of some importance is to recognize
that the language of "strict scrutiny," the language of the so-called new
equal protection clause, is derived essentially from the First Amendment cases; the First Amendment cases in which the argument was
made by Mr. Justice Black and by others for the "firstness" of the First
Amendment. It is this language of legislative presumption that you
find floating through the opinions of the Court now dealing with equal
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protection rather than the First Amendment. The same kinds of burdens on the states, the same kinds of judicial limitations on exercise
of state powers, are found in the equal protection area that once were
the concern of the First Amendment area.
The second point is that both in the First Amendment area and
in the equal protection area the Court speaks in terms of irrebuttable
or unrebuttable presumptions. The essence of most of these cases is
to be found in allocating the burden of proof or the burden of persuasion. With the assignment of the burden of persuasion you achieve a
resolution of the outcome of the controversy, as those whQ are sophisticated about the practice of law have understood for a long time.
One might say he doesn't care what the rule is, so long as he can assign
the burden of proof. Once having assigned the burden of proof, it is
very easy to say that, to hold that, it has not been carried.
Let me say third, and last, that we seem to have evaded, up until
this point-because it is an almost impossible problem for resolutionwhat do we mean by equal protection, or more clearly, what do we mean
by equality? Here, one might take notice of the fact that in the equal protection clause the Constitution uses the word "equal" as an adjective. It speaks, I like to think, of a requirement of equality of treatment.
When we talk about equality as if it were the same thing as equal protection, however, we tend more to be talking about equality of condition.
Equal protection has become a noun and is no longer an adjective.
And it is never clear to the justices or those who read the justices' opinions whether the question they are talking about is equality of condition
of equality of treatment. It is quite clear to many of the professiorial
commentators that what they are seeking is equality of condition. For
them the equal protection clause is the only vehicle; it permits equality of
conditions to be imposed by the judiciary. And that is one of the reasons there is such strong support in the academic writing for the equal
protection opinions of the Supreme Court.
PROFESSOR CHOPER: I would add one or two points. First, I
totally agree with the view that many of the developments in equal protection litigation have been nothing more than the old substantive due
process. And I think it is important to recognize that, in addition, the
irrebuttable presumption device is also nothing more than substantive
due process. So, too, has been the Burger Court's expansion of the notion
that constitutional rights exist even though nowhere mentioned in the
Constitution, a notion most notably put forward in the abortion cases.
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Now it is also true that by the end of the era of the Warren Court
there had been a series of cases which could also be subject to this description. But whether one wants to be critical of the results or not, the
Warren Court decisions were quite straightforwardly stated, and they
also were fairly limited. It's clear that the Court made a constitutional
right out of the right to vote, although it did so under the aegis of the
equal protection clause. Similarly, the Warren Court revived or recreated a constitutionally protected right to travel. And it may well have been
that if the Warren Court had continued, a large number of other essentially substantive constitutional rights would have been developed,
again under the aegis of the equal protection clause. But the decision in
Dandridgev. Williams,47 in which the Court upheld the Maryland maximum welfare grant statute, seemed to put an end to the "fundamental
rights" doctrine. If that had gone the other way, then it may well have
presaged a significant expansion of "fundamental rights" under equal
protection-in essence, substantive due process.
But I am not at all confident that there would have been a
majority of the Warren Court at the end that would have come out differentiy in Dandridge.It is clear, for example, that Mr. Justice Black was
not about to go that route, and there was a strong indication that the
chief justice himself was not about to do so, as evidenced by his dissenting opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson,4 in which he argued that residency requirements for welfare did not violate equal protection. In any
event, we know that the Burger Court formally called a halt to all
of this in Dandridge. This was made even plainer in the school finance
case from Texas in which the Court indicated that it would only occasionally hold a particular right to be protected by the Constitution and
then subject any restriction of it to strict scrutiny when there was a classification made. Otherwise, the Burger Court said that it was at the end of
the road in respect to "fundamental rights" and indeed there are some
cases that bear that out.
But the fact is that it is only in some cases. Take the decision in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas49 where the Court applied the most
deferential rationality standard despite the fact that there were lurking
rights that had been held protected under the Constitution. At least
a reasonably respectable opinion could have been written coming out
the other way in Belle Terre. But the Court simply stated that it was
47. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
48. 394 U.S. 618, 644 (1969) (Warren, C.l, dissenting).
49. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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not going to apply strict scrutiny. On the other hand, they did apply
strict scrutiny in Eisenstadt v. Baird5" without admitting it. They did
it again in the food stamp case, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,51 again without admitting it. They said that they struck
the law down on grounds of irrationality, as they also said in Lindsey
v. Normet5" when invalidating a double bond for appeal provision for
tenants who had been evicted under the Oregon procedures.
While it may be that, in the main, what the Burger Court has done is
not far different from what the Warren Court was doing, I think it is
much less predictable and much less candid. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the direction that the Warren Court had taken, at least it was
mainly done quite openly. I see Phil Kurland shaking his head and I am
anxious to hear his comments on that, although I have seen some of them
on occasion in the past. I believe that the Burger Court is less predictable,
more lacking in candor, and engaging in much more fudging and waffling.
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: I will register a partial dissent. I don't
think the Warren Court was all that candid, but I leave that to Phil. As I
said earlier, I do think the Burger Court is unpredictable. I think that
some of your adjectives and nouns are a little harsh. I think one ought to
distinguish among members of the Burger Court. I think some are trying
harder and doing better at trying to come to grips with the legacy of
doctrine and trying to build a new body than are others. Justice Powell is
being more critical of some of the slipshod stuff that an occasional majority or plurality opinion comes up with, and he is not the only one who
is trying more diligently to come up with coherent statements.
The emphasis on the similarity between the new equal protection
and substantive due process is absolutely right. I think, however, that
that risks losing sight of the fact that there is more to equal protection
than the amorphous strands of the new equal protection.
The hostility to substantive due process was largely a hostility to the
Supreme Court fishing out of thin air its own predilections with inadequate textual, structural and historical justification. It was hostility to the
Court curtailing particular ends of legislation because they did not conform to particular values the majority had unjustifiably "discovered" as
a brake on legislative objectives. But due process, as well as equal protection, has another significant ingredient-a focus on rationality of
50. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
51. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
52. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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means rather than legitimacy of ends. At least one can state that meansingredient distinguishably, although, I confess, the line between means
and ends is hard to draw in practice.
The bad legacy of substantive due process and of ends-oriented
equal protection involves a block to legislative ends, an imposition of
judicial values as to objectives. That is something from which the Burger
Court is overtly retreating-as to equal protection at least, though
not as to due process, as Roe v. Wade"3 shows. Ends scrutiny under equal
protection was something the Warren Court was far more ready to do
and often unjustifiably so in terms of the constitutional basis for it.
The other part of equal protection which I have focused on can be
effective judicial scrutiny which does not by and large second-guess
legislative ends and which simply puts some pressure on the political
process to air more clearly just how its means contribute to the ends it
has chosen to articulate. Now it is a thorny area as I have said, though I
think it is quite doable. I agree that much of the purported means scrutiny of the Burger Court has been disguised ends scrutiny. I do not
think I am persuaded that means scrutiny must always be a subterfuge
for imposing hierarchies of values without saying so. I think there is
-maybe very limited-but some remnant of a justifiable judicial role
with respect to taking seriously a requirement the Court has stated all
along: that there be some minimal rational relationship between
means and ends.
What I tried to suggest in the Foreword-and what I think has
been done by some justices, some lower courts, and occasionally the Supreme Court-is to try to exercise that rationality review of means fairly
and with relative neutrality (if there can be such a thing as relative neutrality). Most of the sex discrimination cases do involve a hidden ingredient and degree of value preference, a sort of semi-suspectness of gender-based classifications without quite saying so. As I have said, I think
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld54 this week may be a case at last to illustrate
the proper approach even where sex isn't involved. The Wiesenfeld
Court goes through an exercise which is replicable in other areas as well,
of simply asking quite honestly just what you can get out of the record as
to legislative purposes, and asking whether the chosen means make any
real contribution to the stated ends.
I think that the means ingredient of equal protection has a legitimacy of its own. It's full of problems, the biggest one no doubt that it risks
53. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
54. 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
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use as a subterfuge for ends scrutiny under a different name. I do not
think that we ought to give up on possible legitimate uses too quickly.
After all, the Court purports to be doing it sometimes. And sometimesmore rarely-it even does so genuinely. I think one useful thing an academic may be able to do is keep yelling at the judges and their law clerks
that they ought to try handling it more honestly, neutrally, generally and genuinely.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: I have just two remarks, if I may. The
first is that the perfidy of the Warren Court is every bit as great as the
perfidy of the Burger Court, and I am prepared to supply a bibliography
on both subjects. I don't think I have been partial to one or the other.
Thomas Reed Powell when introducing Mr. Chief Justice Stone at
a law review banquet at Columbia, said he wanted to introduce a man
who is neither partial on the one hand, nor impartial on the other.
I think that the point made as to the lack of clarity or consistency of
the Burger Court is well taken. But I think it's well taken essentially because there isn't a cohesive majority. It's easier to be consistent when you have a group of five, all of whom share a hierarchy of
values, than when you have a Court which is essentially divided three,
three, and three, and the three in the middle are not a cohesive group
themselves. They just go to one side or the other depending on the issue
involved. So, it is quite true that the Burger Court opinions in this area
do not afford predictability. It's not, however, because of the statements of doctrine they contain, but because of the personal preferences
of each of the jurists.
PROFESSOR FORRESTER: I would like to say that I am doubtful
that the Warren Court, if it had continued would have extended the
equal protection doctrine vigorously. In counting heads, Stewart, it
seems relatively clear, has not fully embraced the substantive equal pro55 concurring opinion
tection concept. His Frontero
is really the swing
opinion which kept the Court from putting sex classifications into the
suspect category. Douglas has declared his hesitation in the Kahn"
case. Warren, in the Shapiro5 7 case, indicated that he had doubt about
the concept. Black, in the Harper"' case, clearly spelled out his repeated objection to such judicial intervention. Now that leaves Mar55.
56.
57.
58.

411 U.S.
416 U.S.
394 U.S.
383 U.S.

677 (1973).
351 (1974).
618 (1969).
663, 670 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
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shall, if you need 'five votes. Here, I would like to read a statement
by Marshall which I think is significant and which may' also describe
the present status of the law in this field, or at least its actual resultoriented operation. In Rodriguez,59 he said,
I must once more voice my disagreement with the Court's rigidifled approach to equal protection analysis. [Citations omitted.]
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection
cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review-strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But
this Court's decisions in the field of equal protection defy such easy
categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done
reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care
with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of
the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of
the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
I find in fact that many of the Court's recent decisions embody
the very sort of reasoned approach to equal protection analysis
for which I previously argued-that is, an approach in which
"concentration [is] placed upon the, character of the classification
in question, the relative importance to the individuals in the class
discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they
do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of
the classification." 60
In other words, Marshall seems not to accept the new equal protection
doctrine as such, but to look upon equal protection as another exercise in
balancing and weighing, or the sifting of the facts and the weighing of
the circumstances, as in the Burton6 ' case.
Counting these five heads makes me dubious whether the Warren
Court would have gone forward more strongly than the Burger Court in
pressing the new equal protection concept. Certainly, so far as the Burger Court is concerned, you can't find a more interventionist decision in
the books than Roe v. Wade, 62 whether you agree with it or not.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: May we then turn to some of the questions. Let me read them and invite the panel members to respond. Question number one is: What is the function of voluntariness, as distinguished from immutability, regarding the treatment granted by the
Court to particular classes?
PROFESSOR KURLAND: I will be glad to answer the question if I
correctly understand it. I think you are talking about what is, or
59.
60.
61.
-62.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, I., dissenting).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
410U.S.113 (1973).
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should properly fall into, a suspect classification and whether this includes only those classes, identifiable classes, made up of what are described by traits which are not changeable. I think, from what the discussion has been here, it is quite clear that race is an immutable class. In
terms of race, you have the greatest protection afforded by the Court.
The issue now is whether race is more than a suspect classification
but one that is invalid per se. Sex-gender-is moving into that category, although, one might say that it is not truly an immutable characteristic, science being what it is. If you look at the groups receiving the
greatest protection from the Court, it is those groups which are identified by immutable traits.
63
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: Aliens are different. In Griffiths, one of
the major cases finding alienage to be a suspect classification, an
alien was not admitted to the bar, and was held impermissibly excluded.
In that case, the alien claimant voluntarily chose not to become a citizen
though she certainly could have become one.
PROFESSOR CHOPER: I have always been somewhat enamored of the notion of using immutability as an important criterion in
extending suspect classifications beyond race. It has always struck me
that there is something peculiarly unfair in government disadvantaging
people in respect to characteristics over which they have no control.
Now, whether legitimate constitutional decision-making can be based
on that sense of unfairness, and its similarity to race, so as to expand
equal protection, is a question well beyond the scope of discussion.
Apart from the humorous suggestion that sex is not totally immutable, it is clear that illegitimacy is. It is pretty difficult to change who your
parents were despite the advances of science. But what about poverty?
This is a classification for which there has been very substantial effort
made to find it "suspect." Certainly, at a theoretical level, poverty is not
an immutable characteristic. People change that condition all the time.
But, on the other hand, perhaps it is immutable in the sense that it is not,
at least in the great range of instances, a characteristic that is held voluntarily. And it is interesting that the question from the audience drew the
comparison of immutability versus something that is voluntary.
I think the factor of immutability has had its influence, although, as
Gerry points out, Justice Rehnquist made quite a point in his dissent in
the most recent alienage cases that the aliens there were voluntary aliens.
But the Court has likely been influenced by the fact that most all of the
laws that states have had discriminating against aliens apply equally to
those who are not in that status voluntarily because they have not as yet
63, In re Griffths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).

Summer 19751

EQUAL PROTECTION

satisfied the minimum residence requirements in the United States to
become citizens.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: The second question is: Does the pendency of the Equal Rights Amendment help to explain La Fleur64 and
especially the relationship of that case to Geduldig?6 5
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: Well I think the pendency of the Equal
Rights Amendment has had some, indeed overt, influence on the
66 did not embrace the idea
Court. Some of the justices in Frontiero
that sex is a suspect classification. Justice Powell's concurring opinion
in that case, applying the rationality standard of Reed, explicitly did
so in part because of reluctance to move to a controversial new constitutional frontier-to tackle a problem that might be taken care of elsewhere by the political institutions. But I don't think the E.R.A. is all
that central. I guess I would not think that Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,67 decided this week, causes trouble for the E.R.A. Wiesenfeld,
by being quite skeptical of gender-based classifications via the rationality standard, achieves some of the objectives of the E.R.A., but it
hardly makes it unnecessary-though it certainly goes further than
other cases have gone.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: I will rephrase the next question slightly.
In light of some lower court developments, would you guess that the
Burger Court will accept the doctrine that homosexuality is a suspect
classification?
PROFESSOR CHOPER: The difficulty with answering that question, it seems to me, is that much of what the Burger Court has done
would point to that end. Homosexuality could fall on either of the two
sides of the strict scrutiny test. It can be subject to strict scrutiny as being
encompassed within the constitutional right of privacy. Or, if sex is becoming a suspect classification, and I certainly think it is, at least in respect to discriminations against women, then it's but a short step to encompassing homosexuality within the suspect group.
The difficulty is that, despite the implications of the opinions, I
don't think the Court is about to take either step. In several opinions
dating back to Griswold v. Connecticut,6" the justices have been very
careful to exclude any implication that they would protect homosexuality. So I rather doubt that the Court would go that way. But the doctrines
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. ,Laneur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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are there, and they may be taken to cover homosexuality quite easily.
Therefore, it is also easy to understand why lower courts might be treating discrimination against homosexuality as being subject to the strict
scrutiny test.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: I would disagree, as usual, with these
gentlemen in terms of predictions and also in terms of the notion that
Griswold v. Connecticut69 is going to be a barrier. Griswold, as you recall, was limited to the marital bedroom. It very quickly became, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,7 0 applicable to relations between persons of different
sexes. I think this is a question like many, if not most, of the questions
before the Court-is dependent on the attitude of the American public.
Just as they were prepared when the American public seemed prepared to condone nonmarital heterosexual relations, I predict that the
Court will not very long from now say that punishment for and discrimination against homosexual relationships cannot be condoned.
As Mr. Choper said, the doctrines are already there to the extent
that there are doctrines. I always like to look into a crystal ball and make
predictions of this sort but ninety-nine percent of the time they don't
come true.
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: I think in this area especially certain
members of the Court can't be faulted for lack of candor. They made this
as overt an area of substantive due process and moral sense judgments as
imaginable. Even before the Griswold case, I guess the most elaborate of
all opinions is Justice Harlan's dissent on the merits of anti-contraception statutes.71 With a very generous interpretation of autonomy and
privacy rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Harlan, in 1961, said
that he recognized the societal and traditional concern with morality, and
that his views regarding protected private activity did not extend to all
areas of private, consensual sexual conduct including homosexuality.
But I think the way he put it was really open-ended in terms of a reflection on what the accepted social norms were in the long range view,
and these are all subject to change.
PROFESSOR FORRESTER: It seems to me that the Court is responsive to the sensitivity of the American people. Just as they have responded to the matter of discrimination against women, which has grown in
the public's attention, I think it is also possible that they may become
more sensitive ultimately to discrimination against homosexuals.
69. Id.
70. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
71. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: I hesitated to participate in this, but I
would suggest that in this particular area the critical question is apt to be:
What kind of discrimination is involved; that is, to what extent has the
state attempted to interfere in any way, or to impose punishment or
burdens because of homosexual activity?
The final question we have is one which asks for a comment on the
male long-hair cases. The question says: "Comment on the failure of the
Supreme Court to take one of these and decide it. Why has the Court
72
hesitated?"
PROFESSOR KURLAND: Let me say that over a recent period of
time the Court was faced with two such problems. One was the question
of the legality of the Viet Nam War and the other was the question
of long hair in high schools.
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: Mr. Justice Douglas has dissented on
both.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: That's right. I suspect they consider one
question too big and the other question too small.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: Do we have any comments from the
floor?
QUESTION: Professor Gunther's model suggests really two parts.
The first part is to test the state's asserted purpose for the classification.
The second part is weighing the classification once you have got over
that hurdle. Is that so different from minimal rationality to be worth
consideration, and, if so, is it a viable standard for the Court to use?
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: Let me disagree with the first part. I
think the model was not one to weigh the state justification. The model
tried to avoid that. It merely tried to make the state articulate its purpose and justification; but it tried to avoid weighing the strength of the
justification and tried to concentrate on a very different issue: of how
much benefit there was-how much contribution of means to ends.
Now, as to the second part, the contribution of means to ends. Reed
v. Reed7 3 is one of the formulations, as Mr. Forrester was saying, that
relied on the Royster Guano case of the pre-1937 era. But as you go
through the cases, that "fair and substantial" basis requirement survived
the 1930's. The Court has not sharply distinguished as to rationality, as
to how much contribution means must make to ends, though a few deci72. Subsequent to this panel discussion the Court has agreed to take a hair case.
Barry v. Dwen, 43 U.S.L.W. 3621 (U.S. May 27, 1975) (No. 74-1269).
73. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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sions of the 1960's, McDonald4 and McGowan7 for example, seemed
to have Chief Justice Warren asking for very little. In short, though Reed
quoted the Royster Guano 6 formulation of the substantive due process
years, the Royster requirement went to means, not ends, and it is not one
that the Court discarded in the years since. In other words, the Warren
Court would have been capable of using, and in fact sometimes did use,
that language, seeing it as being synonymous with minimal scrutiny.
The Burger Court has increasingly used that language when saying
something more is involved in means scrutiny than automatic deference.
The Court, especially since Reed, has put it in terms of real contributions,
substantial contributions, of means to end. How real and substantial?
That is in large part a burden of proof problem. One way to view it is that
it is up to the state, not the Court's imaginativeness, to explain it and to
come forward with information to show relationships which aren't selfevident.
I think that is a viable approach, though one which has to be used
carefully so that you don't sneak in your value preferences as to ends in
applying it. My approach tries very hard to avoid second-guessing and
sharply curtailing legislative ends.
QUESTION: Professor Gunther has suggested that the ad hoe approach of the Burger Court has promoted the flood of litigation in the
equal protection area and created an institutional pressure to create
more predictable standards to curtail the flood of litigation. Do you
think the explicit adoption by the Court of a means-ends approach, as
suggested by Marshall, could effectively act as a predictable standard to
curtail the flood of litigation?
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: Well, that's a very awkward question. I
suggested earlier that the Burger Court's actual behavior runs counter to
the chief justice's concerns about keeping things out of courts. Obviously, if an explicit, across-the-board, "newer equal protection!' means
scrutiny were adopted, it would not curtail the flood of litigation because
a lot of commercial areas might be brought in. Still, I think that ultimately, if they took it seriously and strove for more consistency in the application of that standard, it would be adequately predictable. I think I could
identify cases that would be frivolous under my standard because adequate showings as to means-ends relations would be evident. But a clear74. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
75. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
76. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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er adoption of my approach would open a whole new articulated category of review.
By the way, my approach is different from Justice Marshall's sliding scale approach, as in his Rodriguez dissent,7 7 which involves much
more than means scrutiny.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: Can you think of a case in which all nine
justices would be with you making that determination under your standard?
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: Well, can we split the difference? I can
see where a majority of the Court would emerge on the standard.
QUESTION: I would like to hear what a number of distinguished law
professors feel would be the proper role of the Supreme Court. I am
hearing a number of things from you this morning. One, that the Court
establishes a hierarchy of values, personal values, and this is bad. Another, that they respond to directions of the American people and this is
good. I am wondering if you feel that the Supreme Court should
close down its doors, or if they should start appointing law professors to
be justices, or if you feel that the justices are doing their part and you
professors are doing your part in this creative interchange.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: I think Mr. Choper should answer that
question.
PROFESSOR CHOPER: I think I sense in the question a measure of
justifiable criticism. It is much easier to sit back here and criticize what
the Court has done than to come forward with a series of constructive
suggestions as to what the Court ought to do. My basic criticism of what
is now going on is the lack of candor. It is a very difficult question, indeed the most profound in all constitutional law, as to just how interventionist the Court ought to be in respect to individual liberty. That's really
what we are talking about in these matters of equal protection, irrebuttable presumption, and rights implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
I suggested earlier, and I still believe, that at least the Warren Court
was more candid in what it did. Whether the values that it selected
to be protected by the Constitution were historically justified or within
whatever we define as a legitimate exercise of power by an anti-majoritarian branch of government in American society, is a question subject
to long debate. But at least we knew what the Warren Court was
about.
My own instinct is to prefer the two-tier analysis of equal protection
77. 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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over some middle ground. The difficulty that I have with Mr. Gunther's
proposal is that it would subject virtually every piece of legislation to
judicial review. Further, it would bind the states to articulated ends. But
who articulates those ends? Can a law that has been on the books for
twenty or twenty-five years have its end articulated by a state executive
official or, for that matter, a private party to litigation? The end so stated
may be totally different than that of the legislature that passed the statute. In addition, how does a legislature articulate a law's goals if one of
them is that the lawmaking body is just doing the best that it can at the
time. The Court has approved this approach under the equal protection
clause. It has said that the legislature may take one step at a time. I think
it is critical to permit the legislature this prerogative, to allow it to respond to the pressures of the political process and extend the statute only
so far, to exclude certain people from the receipt of benefits or regulate
only certain people and not others.
I think the Court ought to focus more on the issue of what are the
rights that are implicitly or explicitly protected by the Constitution. Roe
v. Wade7" and the Griswold7 9 case were attempts to do that insofar as the
right of privacy is concerned. I think they failed in seeking to distinguish
that right from any other personal liberties that one might try to describe
as constitutionally secured rights. But at least those cases raised what I
believe to be the right issue for discussion rather than simply taking a
statute which classifies, as all statutes do, and saying that the classification is irrational when it really isn't, at least as that term has come to be
understood.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: I would like to make one comment in
response to the question. That is that there have been on the Supreme
Court, in my years of watching the Court, at least four distinguished
justices who came to the Court after having been law professors.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: They didn't do any better than the others.
PROFESSOR FORRESTER: With reference to the matter of candor, I can't see a great deal of difference between the Warren Court or
the Burger Court in that respect or even the Marshall Court because we
actually have a modus operandiin the judicial field that is result-oriented. I don't think you have to read too many constitutional cases to become aware of the fact that judges are inclined to do what they honestly
believe should be done. They are likely to be quite consistent individual78. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ly in the results that they reach regardless of the details of the case. One
judge takes one direction and the other takes a different one. And you
can predict how a case is going to come out by knowing only the facts
and the name of the judge who wrote the majority opinion. Now, that
means, in effect, that we are, and I hope this doesn't sound too cynical,
in a system where judges decide cases in accord with their personal
conscience and judgment. I believe the results should be reached on
the merits. I don't condemn it. I think it is inevitable; I don't believe
any of us could escape it. The question in my mind is whether it's time
for the Supreme Court to say so, honestly and frankly. I don't know
whether we could get away with that or not. My students in constitutional law surprise me by saying that it would not be desirable for the
Supreme Court to be so frank and open.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: Do your students think the president is
under an obligation to tell the truth?
PROFESSOR FORRESTER: Oh, yes! But, when the students are
asked why they object to the Court's telling the truth, they say it would
not be good for the American people to know that. The students know it.
They think that is desirable; but they say that if the American people
knew, they would lose confidence in the Court as the impartial arbiter,
and that would adversely affect the rule of law.
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: That seems to be a Californian who
made that remark. There is a question, and it may be of primary interest
to law professors, but I don't think it ought to be, not only of how they
psychologically arrive at that result and how they operate, but what justifies their actions. Are they supposed to be interpreting the Constitution, and where do they get that power from; do they want to be candid
about it?
If a John Marshall goes strong for nationalism, as he certainly did,
then at least he was talking about a value which has a fair amount of
constitutional support in the history and the structure of our Constitution. He didn't have to come out that way in all those cases, for extreme
national power. But he was operating within the ball park of constitutional language. Far afield from that, when you are talking about equal
protection as imposing an equal condition, your burden is one heck of a
lot greater than anything that's in that constitutional structure. I suppose
if some of the critics of the Court really believe what they are doing,
imposing their own will, I suppose we ought to be going forward and
saying, "If that's what they are convinced they are doing, then they are
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not doing the job. Do they not need a mandate from the American people
to do that kind of a law reform?"
QUESTION: I invite the panel to decide whether or not the Court
might be on the point of abandoning the only settled element in their
recent adjudication of equal protection law; that is if the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth is applicable with equal force and effect
to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment?
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: The most recent opinions do not distinguish between the limits on the federal and state government as to equal
protection.
After Kahn v. Shevin,80 the government tried to defend Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld l as a benign classification. But Justice Brennan's
majority said that we do not accept that benign label as conclusive-we
look beyond it. And they found this purpose not benign, in light of the
legislative history. But the Court reaffirms there, and in other recent
cases, the modem stance that the Fifth Amendment's due process
clause in effect incorporates the equal protection clause.
They jumped to that conclusion on the basis of the utterly preposterous statement in Bolling v. Sharpe"' that it would be inconceivable
that the states could be subject to more limitations than the federal government. I don't think they are likely to move away from that except,
perhaps, to recognize the special interests of the national government
in such fields as alienage. But the basic synonymousness of the two
clauses is by now well established I believe.
PROFESSOR CHOPER: I think the Court has been quite consistent
in applying the same equal protection standard to the federal government as to the states-indeed, too consistent. I would think, for example, that there are certain kinds of discriminations that the federal government should be able to engage in that the states may not. Alienage is
one. Unlike the states, Article I of the Constitution gives Congress broad
power to regulate immigration and naturalization. Further, I think
Shapiro v. Thompson,83 which involved the right to travel, also went
unthinkingly too far in saying that the federal government is as incapable as the states in regulating people traveling from state to state.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: I interrupt because we have run to the
end of this video tape. I suggest that inasmuch as we set a 12:30 limit to
80.
81.
82.
83.

416 U.S. 351 (1974).
95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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this discussion that, despite lacking tape for the remainder, we continue without the benefit of tape until 12:30.
PROFESSOR CHOPER: Now, we can say all the good things.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: May I put a question to Jess?
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: Proceed.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: In terms of both honesty of the Warren
Court and the various other problems, as an example, we remember that
Mr. Chief Justice Warren said that if a man is deprived of citizenship he
is deprived of all constitutional rights. And yet, the fact is that all aliens
have the same-all of the same constitutional rights, so far tested, as
citizens may have. Do you think that was an honest opinion on Warren's
part?
PROFESSOR CHOPER: I think I can get out of that pretty easily
because I don't think that Chief Justice Warren participated in any significant decisions which struck down discriminations against aliens.
But, as an illustration of candor by the Warren Court, wholly apart from
the correctness of the doctrines it fashioned, when it held the right to vote
was effectively protected by the Constitution it said why. It relied on
older decisions which had described the vote as preservative of all other
rights. In Reynolds v. Sims,"4 when it fashioned the one-person-onevote rule, it said why. Whether right or wrong, whether based on
history or not, the Court openly stated what it felt to be the critical
importance of that particular right. When it fashioned, or perhaps refashioned, the right to travel, in opinions mainly by Justice Stewart, a
right nowhere mentioned in the Constitution at all, at least Justice
Stewart, in comparison, for example, to a decision like Roe v. Wade,"5
pointed to several constitutional sources and added that the right to
travel was in the Articles of Confederation to begin with, suggesting
that perhaps it was accidentally left out of the Constitution.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: That is dishonesty.
PROFESSOR CHOPER: No, it's candor.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: No, it's just plain dishonesty.
PROFESSOR CHOPER: May I distinguish between candor and accuracy, between openness and whether statements are historically justified or consistent with the sources upon which they rely.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: Do you think candor has nothing to do
with truth?
84. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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PROFESSOR CHOPER: I think that it has something to do with
truth; but, I think it is also different.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: -different in defyingPROFESSOR CHOPER: It seems to me that one can candidly state
something that is inaccurate or untrue. But this is very different than
conclusorily stating that a classification is wholly arbitrary or irrational.
Take the classification in Reed v. Reed,"6 in which the states ought to
decrease the number of contestants over who would be the executor of an
estate. Well, it's perfectly clear singling out a particular group as noncontestants was going to reduce the number of contests. Yet the Court
says it was arbitrary and irrational.
PROFESSOR KURLAND: Sort of like Brown v. Board of Educa7
tion.8
PROFESSOR CHOPER: I might agree with Reed but it just seems to
me that the Court in Brown v. Board of Education, whether the rationale was historically justified or not, tried with greater candor to justify
the rationality of the doctrine than in Reed.
PROFESSOR FORRESTER: On the candor point, in Bolling v.
Sharpe, regarding segregation in the District of Columbia, the Court
had no equal protection clause to rely on, as in the companion Brown
case. So they made use of the due process clause, declaring simply that it
was "unthinkable" to hold the law valid. Of course, they were right on
the merits. But what about the use of substantive due process to obtain
the right result? Was that candor? Remember that the opinion was unanimous and included Justices Black and Douglas-repeated critics of
substantive due process.
PROFESSOR CHOPER: I think the Court was simply saying that it
was unthinkable to have a different standard applying to racial segregation in the District of Columbia than in the states. Now whether that is
right or not, and whether that is justified or not, is a separate question.
PROFESSOR FORRESTER: How about the "shocking" test of Rochin v. California?""
PROFESSOR CHOPER: Well, that's not one of my favorites, nor do
I think it was an opinion that was representative of what we commonly
describe as the Warren Court.
"404"U.S.71 (1971).
87. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
88. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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QUESTION: During the first session of the House of Representatives,
Madison and Hamilton argued whether they should include the Bill of
Rights. The product of that was the Ninth Amemdment, which gave to
the people all rights which had not been enumerated. The Court succeeded in forgetting about the Ninth Amendment until Griswold8" in
1965. Justice Goldberg found in the Ninth Amendment a right of privacy. In his concurring opinion, I wonder whether you feel [sic] that
a fundamental view of the equal protection clause was a large part?
Do either of you men feel there is any role for the Ninth Amendment
vis a vis equal protection?
PROFESSOR FORRESTER: I think the role depends upon the five
votes in the Supreme Court. The Court is influenced by many factors
including precedent. But, if the Court wants to expand the Ninth
Amendment, they will do it and they can do it. Whether they should
do it or not is debatable.
PROFESSOR GUNTHER: I certainly haven't seen any case made as
to the meaning of the Ninth Amendment. I don't think the Ninth
Amendment offers a short cut for explaining how you get to the new
fundamental right-how you define it and justify it. In other words,
even if it says, as Justice Goldberg seemed to say, that it is a confirmation of a legitimate Court power to identify fundamental rights, that
does not really help-it is essentially a restatement of substantive due
process, and it still leaves the task of explaining which rights are so
fundamental, and why. I don't think the Ninth Amendment can be
waved as a wand to avoid that kind of demonstration and justification.
PROFESSOR CHOPER: I just don't think it adds anything to other
clauses of the Constitution that the Court uses. What Mr. Gunther said
the Court can do. So whether fundamental rights might be revived
through the Ninth Amendment or the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment isn't going to make much difference.
PROFESSOR SULLIVAN: I wonder if it is not something like the
way Justice Stone categorized the Tenth Amendment. It is a truism that
it is merely that which is not delegated. And the Ninth Amendment is something similar to that; that we have rights but they may
not be spelled out specifically. The Court has a way of finding them
in other provisions of the Constitution.
We are past the hour of adjournment. Let me on behalf of Hastings
89. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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College and the Hastings ConstitutionalLaw Quarterly express our appreciation to our panelists. I hope that we may continue this kind of
discussion at sometime in the near future.

